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Abstract
e animal mindreading debate is coined with theoretical and practical problems which have
lead some to believe that it has reached a stalemate. Since Premack andWoodruﬀ have asked
whether the chimpanzee has a theory of mind over 30 years ago, the question is still on the
table. Even though a lot of evidence has been brought forward by both sides, proponents and
opponents of the view that animals can be mindreaders, nothing is deënitive. e essential
problems remain unresolved.
e two main problems are the diﬃculty to experimentally support the mindreading
hypothesis in nonverbal animals against competing lower-level explanations, like comple-
mentary behaviour-reading hypotheses, and the diﬃculty of explaining the psychological
mechanisms which produce the mindreading in question. e ërst issue is typically dis-
cussed in terms of ‘the logical problem’ while the second is known as the discussion between
eory eory and Simulation eory of mindreading.
In this dissertation, I will discuss these issues and oﬀer possible solutions of how to
go about solving the problems in a way that will hopefully leverage the discussion. Most
importantly, I will show that it is essential to understand the nature of mental content that
is required for mindreading. Furthermore, I propose tests which should be able to detect
the ability of nonverbal animals to understand diﬀerent mental state concepts which are
required for mindreading.
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MINDREADING IN CHIMPANZEES —
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES IN
THE ANIMAL MINDREADING DEBATE
1 Introduction
Why should we be interested in the cognitive abilities of nonlinguistic animals like chimpan-
zees? What is philosophically interesting about investigating animal minds? ere are many
diﬀerent answers to these questions, but let me brieìy outline two possible answers and then
go on to give my own reasons for believing that discussing animal mindreading is important.
Investigating the functioning of our mind is an essential task in modern cognitive science
and philosophy of mind. A fundamental component of tackling this task requires us to ënd
out the connections between diﬀerent capabilities, like for example the connection between
language and cognition. It is a common view that language is prerequisite to many forms
of thinking, and these are thus thought to be exclusively human. Abstract thinking, having
higher-order metarepresentational mental states, full-blown rationality, and the possession
of a theory of mind are held to be dependent on the ability to think in words. But it is far
from obvious why this should be true.
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While it might be true that the listed cognitive abilities are made possible in human
beings by our public language, it is questionable why there shouldn’t be other possible ways
of achieving those mental skills in other animals and humans alike.
A second reason is the evolutionary history of the human mind, which can give us in-
sights on the function and interdependence of the diﬀerent cognitive parts and skills that
have been acquired over time. Looking at evolutionary close animals like the chimpanzee
and getting hold of their cognitive abilities may allow us to draw conclusions about the evol-
ution of our own mind. If chimpanzees have a theory of mind, then our own ability to read
others’ minds might be much older than if it was dependent on language, which may have
evolved later.
e importance of social cognition for the thriving of human society and the necessity
to further our understanding of mental concepts like perception, belief, emotion, desire,
intention, consciousness, self-consciousness, and mindreading give further reasons to ënd
out the way mindreading works in humans and non-human animals alike.
However, there are two further reasons I want to point out which make it imperative
to give attention to animal cognition research. Culturally, human societies have evolved as
a system that uses animals without questioning the moral validity of that practice. Among
the reasons that have rationalized this procedure is the naïve view that non-human animals
are substantially inferior to humans which allows us to use them to satisfy our desires and
interests. We used to believe that animals do not have the ability to think, feel pain, or be
rational, and these beliefs have been used to rationalize our actions towards them.
However, there is a growing suspicion that most of those prejudices towards non-human
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animals are accurate and how that relates to the moral question of whether it is allowed to
use animals to serve our interests. However, the moral importance of cognitive abilities is
highly questionable, since more basic capabilities like the capacity for suﬀering and feeling
pain are what matters morally. But on a very pragmatic level, acknowledging the cognitive
similarities between humans and other animals challenges our practices directly. If humans
are very like other animals in some signiëcant respect, why can we harm the latter and ignore
their interests, but not those of other human beings?
In that respect, thinking about the cognitive abilities of chimpanzees serves the project of
undermining the rationale behind many of the practices that involve humans causing pain
and suﬀering of other animals. If chimpanzees turn out to be cognitively much like young
humans, how can we then morally justify the permission to cause pain to the former in ex-
periments but not the latter? In the end, there are few reasons other than that chimpanzees
are not humans, which rightfully is no moral reason at all (Cf. Francione 1995; Singer 1975;
Regan 2004).
In the following I will investigate the supposed ability of chimpanzees to understand
and attribute mental states like beliefs and desires to other individuals, like conspeciëcs
and humans. Do chimpanzees know what others see or only what they are looking at? Are
they genuinely having thoughts about others’ mental states or are they just reading and
interpreting their behaviour and do not engage in genuine mindreading activities? Do they
have a concept of a belief and are they capable of higher-order mental representations?
In order to ënd out if chimpanzees are mindreaders, I will ërst introduce the essential
terms, distinctions and problems about mindreading in general in the next section. We will
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see that there are diﬀerent hypotheses that are competing to explain the phenomena, which
some believe are best explained by attributing mindreading abilities to chimpanzees. It will
be shown that there is a speciëc logical problem that needs to be overcome to strengthen
the mindreading hypotheses against other competitors. How can we distinguish animal
mindreading abilities from their behaviour-reading abilities, if all we can observe is their
behaviour? It is doubtful whether this problem has been solved yet, or is likely to be solved
in the near future.
ereafter, I will present in the third part two diﬀerent views of how mindreading op-
erates and is cognitively structured in the mind, simulation theory (ST) and theory theory
(TT), and link these two diﬀerent theories to the supposed mindreading abilities in chim-
panzees. Furthermore, I will investigate the problem of ëxing the content of mindreading
activities. If chimpanzees can read others’ minds, what is the mental (representational) con-
tent of that cognitive process? I will argue that genuine mindreading requires metarepresent-
ational content at some point or other.
Finally, in the fourth part, I will discuss the empirical and theoretical evidence for chim-
panzee mindreading abilities. e investigation will be separated into diﬀerent sections
dealing with diﬀerent mental states, seeing and knowing on one hand, beliefs on the other. It
will become evident that the more complex and elaborate the mental state in question is, the
harder it gets to ënd evidence for the ability of chimpanzees and other nonverbal creatures
to understand those states.
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2 Mindreading, behaviour reading and the logical problem
Social cognition is an important aspect of human lives and also those of social animals like
birds (Clayton et al. 2007; Kacelnik 1984), bees, apes (Hare & Wrangham 2002; Addessi
& Visalberghi 2006; Visalberghi & Addessi 2003), canines (Holekamp & Engh 2002), and
dolphins (Connor & Mann 2006). Generally, it is the ability to mentally process informa-
tion about conspeciëcs and use this to navigate in the social space of that species or environ-
ment. However it is highly debatable how far the abilities of non-human animals reach and
especially, if they are capable of attributing genuine mental states to other conspeciëcs (Cf.
Hurley & Nudds 2006; Lurz 2011)¹. e ability to understand and interpret the behaviour
of others is of great importance to the interaction amongst human beings (Goldman 2006:
3) and it is equally crucial to the social lives of other animals. However, while there might
be overwhelming evidence that humans are generally capable of attributing mental states to
others (i.e. being capable of mindreading), there is a lively debate on whether or not other
animals can understand others’ mental states and possess mental state concepts.
ere is no doubt that animals do react to the actions of others, and also that they
react, at least sometimes, because of those actions². However, closing your eyes upon seeing
an incoming punch to the face is essentially unlike giving a friend a present to lighten his
mood. While the former is an immediate bodily reaction to the behaviour of someone else,
¹Here I will focus on the ability to understand mental states like seeing, knowing, desiring, believing, etc.
ere are of course other mental states, the understanding of which is important in social cognition, e.g. moods
and feelings (Tanner & Byrne 1993; DeWaal 1986). But for simplicity’s sake, I will largely restrict the discussion
to the former category. ere is of course a general worry here that those states are too sophisticated for non-
human animals, and that we should instead focus on other, more simple, states, but that would be a hasty
judgement of the cognitive abilities of non-human animals.
²I will use the term ‘action’ in a loose way that includes both intentional and non-intentional behaviour
in order to circumvent problems about intentionality in non-human animals and facilitate the discussion by
focussing on what matters for the question about mindreading. Furthermore, it is unclear how to properly
understand the term because, for it is an open question if non-human animals can act for reasons in our sense of
the words, or if the connection has to be understood in diﬀerent terms (Glock 2009, 2010).
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the latter could be interpreted as a reaction to the fact that the friend is sad or wants some
aﬀection. e latter seems to involve the recognition of an other’s mental state, while the
former does not.
Even though it seems like this distinction is easily made, there are of course many dif-
ferent types of actions which are very hard to classify and explain correctly. However, we
can, in theory, distinguish at least three types of mental mechanisms which bring about the
actions in question:
(1) First oﬀ there are actions which are directly caused by the actions of others and do not
involve thinking in a signiëcant way. e mental mechanism underlying these actions
are of a very causal and rigid input-output nature. us the cognitive mechanism that
produces the action is a very simple and inìexible one.
(2) Secondly, there are actions which are a reaction to a speciëc behaviour shown by an-
other animal (e.g. ìeeing upon the sight of a predator, or anticipating friendly beha-
viour upon seeing ‘play bows’ in dogs (Cf. Bekoﬀ 1977)). ese actions are generally
brought about by a mental mechanism which involves taking behavioral and environ-
mental data as inputs and generating a speciëc output. I will use the term behaviour
reading to designate the cognitive process which is involved in these types of actions.
e animal’s reaction is is thus generated by its recognizing and interpreting of the
behaviour (and only that) of other animals. Of course, there are very diﬀerent forms
of behaviour reading mechanisms with varying levels of complexity and ìexibility.
(3) Finally, there are mechanisms which involve the subject attributing mental states to
others and acting, at least in part, as a result of those attributions and interpretations.
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ese are cases of mindreading and are very common in human social behaviour.
In what follows, I will focus on the distinction and interrelation between behaviour
reading and mindreading, for these two abilities are commonly used to explain intentional
social behaviour of chimpanzees and other non-human animals. Proponents of the view that
chimpanzees are mindreaders are ready to explain their behaviour by admitting that they are
able to understand at least some mental states of others. By contrast, opponents of this view
generally oﬀer an explanation that relies only on behaviour reading abilities³.
2.1 Mindreading and behaviour reading
e scientiëc research of the ability of mindreading pretty much started with Premack and
Woodruﬀ’s famous paper ‘Does e Chimpanzee Have A eory Of Mind?’ (1978) where
they conducted experiments on chimpanzees in order to investigate their ability to under-
stand mental states of others. eir initial deënition of the term ‘theory of mind’ (TOM)
was that ‘in saying that an individual has a theory of mind, we mean that the individual
imputes mental states to himself and others (...)’. ey state that ‘a system of inferences of
this kind is properly viewed as a theory, ërst, because such states are not directly observ-
able, and second, because the system can be used to make predictions, speciëcally about the
behaviour of other organisms’ (p. 515).
However, the term ‘theory of mind’ is sometimes exchanged for the more neutral term
‘mindreading ’, since the latter does not imply the possession of any implicit of explicit law-
like theory (Goldman 2006: 10). For this reason, I will mostly use the term ‘mindreading’
³It is tempting to think that the distinctions above are clear-cut ones. But in fact there are a great lot of
subdivisions and interrelations which can only in part be taken into account here. e distinction between
mindreading, involving attribution of beliefs and desires, and mood-reading is only one example.
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to denote the ability of attributing mental states like beliefs, desires, intentions, and percep-
tual experiences to others (both conspeciëcs and members of other species).
Human beings use mindreading in a wide variety of situations when they are using be-
havioral information to predict and manipulate behaviour of others, but also in order to
understand and explain (Lurz 2011: 2)⁴. So we explain an agent’s buying an ice-cream
by attributing a want to eat ice-cream to him. Similarly, we predict future behaviour of a
thirsty looking person by thinking that she wants something to drink and believes that there
is water in the fridge, which leads us to believe that she will move to the fridge and get
some water. e mental processes which precede he explanation and prediction of actions
is thus something that is going on in the mind of the mindreading subject. Even though we
might be engaging less often in mindreading activities than is often thought (Cf. Bermúdez
2009; Povinelli & Vonk 2006; Baldwin & Baird 2001), the evidence that human beings are
capable of mindreading is overwhelming.
However, mindreading in animals is heavily debated for some signiëcant reasons. First,
it is important to note that when discussing the possibility of mindreading animals, it is
generally assumed that many animals, especially most mammalian species, and perhaps more
simple-minded creatures (Cf. Carruthers 2004), have minds. ese animals are generally
believed to have ërst-order mental states like perceptions, emotions, beliefs and intentions of
⁴Prediction, explanation, and attribution are technically a linguistic activity. ey are thus technically not
available to nonverbal animals. However, since there is a cognitive mechanism that precedes the speech-act of
predicting, explaining, or attributing, it is plausible to use these terms loosely to designate the respective mechan-
isms, which is not necessarily a linguistic process. In the case of predicting, there is something like an expectation
of the subject about what will most likely happen next, and the subject will feel a need for explaining an action
if these expectations are violated in some sense. Furthermore, verbally attributing something to someone goes in
hand with a mental activity that involves imputing something to someone. For matters of simplicity and in order
to use the same terminology as elsewhere in the literature, I will use prediction, explanation, and attribution to
designate the psychological mechanism underlying those speech acts.
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some kind. And secondly, since non-human animals can only be observed by the behaviour
they show and not by verbal reports of their own mental states and thoughts, explanations
of animal behaviour that only involve behaviour reading are readily at hand.
It is important to emphasize that the term ‘behaviour reading’ in general does not sug-
gest that the animal’s predictions and interpretations are only made on the basis of learned
behaviour rules or pure associations. ey might rely on innate mechanisms which lead the
animal to anticipate speciëc behaviour when being confronted with a speciëc perceptual
condition. It might even be possible that some types of behaviour-reading are based on a
form of embodied simulation as will be seen later in this paper (Cf. Lurz 2011).
So how can we distinguish mindreading from behaviour reading in nonverbal animals?
is problem can be nicely illustrated by looking at Premack and Woodruﬀ’s paper that was
mentioned beforehand.
e two authors conducted a series of experiments with chimpanzees, designed to test
their ability to understand diﬀerent mental states like intentions, goals, or beliefs. In one
of the experiments a chimpanzee, Sarah, was shown a videotape of a person facing diﬀerent
problems, like trying to reach for something that was out of reach, or trying to reach for
objects that were obstructed. Before the solution of the problem was shown, the videotape
was stopped, and Sarah was presented with two pictures of possible scenarios, one of which
was constituting a solution while the other was not. Sarah then had to choose one of those
pictures (Premack & Woodruﬀ 1978: 516).
ese experiments were meant to decide between diﬀerent possible explanations of how
Sarah would go about solving the problem: (a) associationism, (b) theory of mind and (c)
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empathy.
According to associationism, animals recognize diﬀerent types of actions and their re-
spective routines. If a speciëc action is interrupted before the routine is ënished, it chooses
the solution that ëts the type of action that is being represented. e animal therefore associ-
ates the action in the experiment with other versions of that action that it has encountered in
her life and chooses the solution accordingly. However, Premack and Woodruﬀ argue that
this particular explanation has weaknesses when dealing with future events and encounters
with new problems which have no association with past actions or routines. Nevertheless,
they concur that it is possible to ënd associative explanations in all of the successful exper-
iments they conducted, which makes it hard to rule out associationism in their case. is
will be a common problem in many experiments. How can we provide reasons that some-
thing other than learned routines and making associations is responsible for the supposed
mindreading behaviour in question?
According to the theory of mind explanation, which is favored by the authors, Sarah
attributes mental states to the actor in the video sequence. On one hand she imputes inten-
tions and goals to the actor (i.e. ‘she wants to get the thing out of reach’), and on the other
hand knowledge and belief (i.e. ‘she knows the solution to this problem’). e chimpanzee
makes sense of the actors behaviour by assuming that the actor wants the object out of reach
and knows how to reach it, which is why Sarah picks out the correct solution when the
videotape is stopped.
Finally, according to empathy explanations, the chimpanzee puts itself ‘into the shoes
of the actor’, so to speak. It then chooses the solution that it would realize, if itself were in
that situation. In this sense then, Sarah’s choice is not an expectation of what the actor will
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do, but a representation of what she herself would do, were she in the actor’s situation. is
is essentially the simulation view of mindreading. e authors acknowledge this by stating
the similarities to the theory of mind explanation. In both cases, the chimpanzee identiëes
mental states of the actor (e.g. intentions and goals, knowledge and beliefs), which makes
it a case of mindreading. But the explanations diﬀer in how then these inputs are further
computed and used to arrive at a decision or expectation.
e success with which Sarah chose the correct solution to the problems led to the con-
clusion that the chimpanzee was capable of attributing mental states (e.g. wanting the ob-
jects out or reach or believing that there is a speciëc solution) and made her decision based
on these attributions. ey argue that admitting the possession of a theory of mind oﬀers the
simplest kind of explanation to the phenomena, whereas the other explanations are weaker,
since they are based on ad hoc hypotheses about the associations that are drawn out by the
chimpanzee, or lack empirical evidence. is already shows the common way of deciding
between behaviour-reading and mindreading explanations, which often involves an inference
to the best explanation kind of argument (Cf. Tomasello & Call 2006).
However, among the commentators of the article were three philosophers that raised
an interesting point. Dennett (1978), Harman (1978) and Bennett (1978) showed their
doubt about the conclusion made by the original authors of the study. While a mentalistic
explanation is coherent and ëts the results of the experiment, it is doubtful whether the
experiment in fact favors it over a non-mentalistic explanation which does not rely on the
ability to attribute mental states to others. e problem they pointed out was that the
experimental paradigm of the study is incapable of empirically distinguishing between a
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mentalistic and non-mentalistic process. erefore, Premack and Woodruﬀ fail to show
that mindreading is the best explanation of the chimpanzees’ behaviour. Everything they
were able to show by their experiment was that chimpanzees can master these kinds of tasks.
e problem of experimentally distinguishing cognitive processes that involve mental
state attribution from cognitive processes that only involve observing of behavioral and en-
vironmental indicators has been labeled the ‘logical problem’ and is considered to be a fun-
damental problem of research on animal mindreading abilities (Lurz 2011: 9; Hurley &
Nudds 2006: 58). e logical problem therefore consists in the question of how best to ex-
plain some of the phenomena of social cognition. Is it best to claim that the animal possess
mindreading-abilities, or is this an unnecessary addition of a mental mechanism which is
not warranted by the empirical data?
Furthermore, the three commentators pointed towards the necessity of designing a test
which can clearly indicate the possession of the concept of a belief by testing for the under-
standing of false belief in others (Harman 1978). Harman proposes one such test that could
identify the diﬀerence between recognition of behavioral and environmental indicators and
attribution of mental states. In this test, an observing chimpanzee (O) is shown a scene
where another chimpanzee (S) sees a food item placed under one of two containers. O then
observes that the location of the food is changed by the experimenter without S being able
to see it. If O expects S to look under the container where the food was originally placed,
we can assume that he attributes to S the belief that the food is where S has seen it being
placed. is would then show that the chimpanzee has an ‘conception of mere belief ’ (p.
577).
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Possession of the concept of belief is often considered to be fundamental to the possession
of other mental state concepts like desires, intentions and goals (Davidson 1975; Davidson
1980). However, this view has widely been challenged (Bermúdez 2003: Chapter 6; Lurz
2011: Chapter 4), especially by researchers in the ëeld of animal mindreading who suggest
that mindreading is not an all-or-nothing aﬀair (Tomasello 1999). Instead, understanding
of diﬀerent mental states should be explored individually and not based on the success in
false belief tasks.
In this section we have seen the diﬀerent approaches which are possible to explain speciëc
types of animal social cognition. While behaviour reading only depends on the recognition
and interpretation of behavioral and environmental indicators, mindreading requires the
subject to impute mental states to others. First, it is important to note that mindreading
depends heavily on behaviour reading and that there are diﬀerent possibilities of interac-
tion between the two of them (Whiten 1996). Secondly, social cognition is not exhausted
by the kind of tasks which are in the focus here (e.g. explanation and prediction of oth-
ers’ behaviour). In fact, social cognition might very likely involve quite diverse cognitive
mechanisms and systems which are speciëcally designed for picking up diﬀerent things (e.g.
moods, feelings, judgements, and what not) in diﬀerent species. And thirdly, it shouldn’t be
thought that the focus on mental state attribution, including beliefs and desires, is meant to
restrict the discussion on the ‘folk psychology’ aspect of social cognition (Carruthers 1996).
Mindreading can happen in absence of anything like a folk psychological theory of mind.
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2.2 e logical problem
I will now discuss the challenge to mindreading explanations which we called the ‘logical
problem’ in more detail. We have seen that the reaction to Premack and Woodruﬀ’s paper
showed some doubt over their favoured (mentalistic) interpretation. However, it is plausible
to think that this doubt stems in part from the fact that the experiment used a novel protocol
and its methodology was rather weak for it to support the wanted conclusion. In any case
the empirical data and methodology has greatly improved in recent years, especially after the
comments made by Harman, Dennett, Bennett and others (Lurz 2011: 10). is lead to
the possibility of making stronger claims and commitments about the mindreading-ability
of non-human animals.
Nonetheless there have been some inìuential opponents who always favor a strong
behaviour-reading hypothesis over a mentalistic explanation. According to this hypothesis,
non-human animals can not understand mental state concepts, but instead make sense and
predict others’ actions only by looking at the behavioral and environmental facts and indic-
ators. ey do this by learning from experience, infererence, and maybe by possessing innate
structures and mechanism (Lurz 2011: 22). Among the chief defendants of these kinds of
behaviour-reading explanations is Daniel Povinelli, who strongly argues for the in principle
incapability of current experimental paradigms to determine the animal’s understanding of
mental states (Povinelli & Vonk 2006; Vonk& Povinelli 2006; Penn& Povinelli 2007; Penn
et al. 2008; Tomasello & Call 1997).
For example, Vonk and Povinelli write that ‘there is ample evidence to conclude what
we already knew: chimpanzees are keen observers of readily perceivable features of the social
world, and make predictions about future states of that world on the basis of such features’
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(Vonk & Povinelli 2006: 372). is in turn means that the authors feel no urge to employ
mentalistic explanations of the observed phenomena, but in fact think that a purely non-
mentalistic explanation, only involving behaviour-reading mechanisms, is suﬃcient, and for
theoretical reasons superior.
e best way to characterize the logical problem is by contrasting two diﬀerent psycho-
logical systems, Sb and Sb +ms. e former is a system that is ‘dedicated to social cognition,
but one which forms and uses concepts about only ‘behaviours’ which can, in principle,
be observed’ (Povinelli & Vonk 2006: 391). at is, a system which is only capable of
behaviour-reading. e latter however is a system capable of both behaviour-reading and
mindreading and thus can, in principle, attribute mental states to others. It is ‘a system
which must perform joint computations about both the behaviour and the mental states
of other organisms in order to successfully predict future behaviour’ (p. 391). e logical
problem is then stated as follows:
e general diﬃculty is that the design of these tests [which investigatemindread-
ing capabilities] necessarily presupposes that the subject notices, attends to,
and/or represents, precisely those observable aspects of the other agent that are
being experimentally manipulated. Once this is properly understood, however,
it must be conceded that the subject’s predictions about the other agent’s fu-
ture behaviour could be made either on the basis of a single step from knowledge
about the contingent relationships between the relevant invariant features of the
agent and the agent’s subsequent behaviour, or on the basis of multiple steps from
the invariant features, to the mental states, to the predicted behavior. Without an
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analytical speciëcation of what additional explanatory work the extra cognitive
step is doing in the latter case, there is nothing to implicate the operation of
Sb +ms over Sb alone (p. 393, emphasis mine).
It is a matter of debate what exactly speciëes the ‘additional explanatory work’ which
is necessary. From a theoretical point of view, the question of simplicity of explanation is
important in deciding between two competing theories, in our case the mindreading and
behaviour-reading hypothesis. However, simplicity is polysemous and there are at least two
diﬀerent principles which are in conìict here. On one hand, Morgan’s canon, which states
that we should prefer explanations of animal behaviour that make use of fewer, and less
complex, mental states, gives us reason to avoid postulating higher-order mechanisms if
the phenomena can be explained by lower-order mechanism. ere is no question that
mindreading involves higher-order mechanisms when compared to mere behaviour-reading,
and also that it is often possible to explain the phenomena using only lower-order mechan-
isms. However, in using only behaviour-reading abilities to explain the phenomena, many
additional hypotheses are added which amounts to a less simple and elegant overall explana-
tion of the phenomena (Cf. Hurley & Nudds 2006; Tomasello & Call 2006). Nonetheless,
if the phenomena can in principle be explained by lower-order mechanisms, there is an ap-
parent theoretical problem for the mindreading hypothesis, even if it might be simpler and
more economical in a quantitative sense.
Additionally, Povinelli claims that there is a complementary behaviour-reading hypothesis
for every mindreading hypothesis in nonverbal animals. e reason is that in conducting
experiments which are designed to ënd out whether a nonverbal animal has mindreading
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abilities, the only indicators for the experimentor are behavioral cues and facts that can be
observed in the experiment. All supposed mental state attributions in nonverbal animals
have to be based on the observable features of the experiment which automatically yield a
behaviour-reading hypothesis that only relies on those facts, which in turn does not impose
additional non-observable mental state attributions.
When we attribute mindreading abilities to a nonverbal animal based on these kinds of
experiments, Povinelli claims that one unnecessarily adds a further theoretical step (i.e. the
mental state attribution step) for unjustiëed reasons. If an animal’s behaviour can be ex-
plained by taking the observable facts and the animals reaction, there seems to be no need to
induce an additional step wherein the animal has thoughts about the mental states of others.
erefore, according to the behaviour-reading hypothesis, ‘identifying and then analyzing
exactly the behavioral/environmental variables that best predict future behavior of other
agents because they reliably constrain the future behavior of these agents, is, functionally,
what a system that is specialized for behavior reading does’ (Lurz 2011: 28).
e general argument that is incorporated in the logical problem is thus the following
(Cf. Lurz 2011: 76-7):
1. ere is a mindreading hypothesis according to which an animal A anticipates that
another agent B will perform behaviour r on the grounds that B is in some mental
state m, and that B’s being in m is likely to lead him to do r.
2. Mental concept applications are based on the observation of behavioral indicators.
erefore A has to apply the mental state conceptm on the grounds of some behavioral
indicator s about B’s behaviour or environment.
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3. ere is a complementary behaviour-reading hypothesis which replaces A’s mental
state attribution ofm to B with A’s acknowledging the fact that the behavioral indicator
s obtains.
4. If there is reason to believe that A has observed s-type indicators in connection with
r-type behaviour in other animals, or himself, then it is plausible to suppose that A
anticipates B doing r on the grounds that s obtains. is means that A does not
additionally need to attribute m to B in order to anticipate B’s r-behaviour.
5. ere is no experimental paradigm which is able to eliminate the plausibility of 4.
) ere is no experimental paradigm that can distinguish between the mindreading hy-
pothesis and the complementary behaviour-reading hypothesis.
is argument however does not show that the logical problem cannot be overcome
(Cf. Lurz 2011). By designing a test that tackles the problem of ënding evidence that
can rule out a complementary behaviour-reading hypothesis in a speciëc task (i.e. ënding
evidence that shows the falsity of 5.), the logical problem can be ruled out and the corres-
ponding mindreading hypothesis given the needed empirical weight. However, as we will
see in chapter 4, it is doubtful whether such a test has been designed as of yet, and if it is
in principle possible. e theoretical argument presented as the logical problem thus needs
further theoretical and empirical evidence to prove that it is in principl impossible to show
that nonverbal animals are capable of mindreading.
In this section, I have illustrated the logical problem of experimentally distinguishing
mindreading from behaviour-reading which has been stated by diﬀerent people but is most
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strikingly defended by Povinelli and colleagues. e fact that it seems possible to form a
complementary behaviour-reading hypothesis for every test on nonverbal animals which
relies on behavioral indicators, makes it hard for defendants of the mindreading hypothesis
to give their mentalistic interpretation enough theoretical and empirical support. It also
underlines the need for a speciëc experimental paradigm that is capable of solving the logical
problem, if the mindreading hypothesis is to be upheld for nonverbal animals.
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3 eories of Mindreading and their representational content
As we have seen, the mindreading discussion has been initialized by Premack andWoodruﬀ’s
paper on chimpanzees’ mindreading abilities. It quickly extended to the domain of devel-
opmental psychology and cognitive science in general, where two diﬀerent general theories
about how mindreading might cognitively work, eory eory (TT) and Simulatione-
ory (ST)⁵, have been developed and ëne-tuned. Most of the research that fuels the discussion
amongst the proponents of both theories is found in child developmental research, however,
for various reasons, insights from nonverbal, non-human animals like apes and others are
often used to support claims for either theory⁶. Furthermore, there are, as always, diﬀerent
versions of both theories and also some attempts to combine the two in order to get a fuller
explanation without suﬀering from the faults that come with both theories on their own.
In general, TT assumes that mindreading is achieved by an implicit or explicit theory of
how the mind works, and there are variations of how theoretical they are, i.e. how coher-
ent and tight the underlying principles need to be (Carruthers & Smith 1996). e most
common example of a version of TT is the belief-desire folk psychological theory of mind.
According to this, most human adults have an underlying theory according to which ac-
tions are guided by the beliefs and desires of the agent, and accordingly, their mindreading
interpretations and predictions are based on these principles (Cf. Davidson 1963; Botterill
1996)⁷.
⁵ese two theories roughly map onto Premack and Woodruﬀ’s characterization of ‘theory of mind’ (as a
rough form of TT), and ‘empathy’ (as a rough form of TT) (Cf. Goldman 2006).
⁶Especially research on simulation theory that involves intrusive experiments (e.g. experiments that discuss
the cognitive structure and functioning of mirror neurons (Cf. Addessi & Visalberghi 2006: 323; Pepperberg
2006: 477)) is often restricted for (doubtful) ethical reasons to non-human animals and then used to draw
conclusions about the supposed human equivalent mind structure (Cf. Lurz 2011: 4).
⁷is does not imply that animal mindreading has to be anything like belief-desire folk psychology. It is
only necessary to be implicitly theory/principle-driven.
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By contrast, ST holds that mindreading does not need an underlying theory containing
principles of the human decision-making process. Instead, mindreaders can simply run a
simulation of this process by inputing others’ mental states and using the output of their
own decision-making mechanism as basis to explain and predict others’ behaviour. is is
to say that ‘mindreaders use their own minds to “mirror” or “mimic” the minds of others’
(Goldman 2006: 20). In order to prevent the result of the ‘mirroring’ decision-making
process leading to an action, defendants of ST generally hold that these simulations are run
oﬀ-line or detached, so that the output does not result in an actual action.
In this section, I will discuss the pros and cons of both TT and ST and relate them to the
question of the possibility of mindreading chimpanzees and other animals. Furthermore,
the question of what content drives the respective mindreading process according to TT
and ST will be evaluated. It will be argued that both theories need a mental state with
metarepresentational content at some point. If genuine mindreading is supposed to happen,
thinking about mental states is necessary.
3.1 eory eory and Simulation eory
It is not the aim here to give a full overview of all the arguments for and against either theory
and all their respective versions. Rather, the relevance to explaining animal mindreading
and the question of the representational content of both theories will be important⁸. In this
section, the ërst issue will be discussed, while the second question will be tackled in the
⁸In fact, it is very likely that a mix of both ST and TT is needed to fully explain animal mindreading mech-
anisms (Perner 1996). e diverse mental tasks involved in mindreading require an equally diverse cognitive
architecture that is best accommodated by a mix of ST and TT. However, for simplicity’s sake, I will here only
discuss the two theories in isolation.
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following section.
As we have seen, TT relies on the assumption that there are some underlying, sometimes
implicit, principles that govern the explanation and prediction of others’ behaviour by look-
ing at their supposed mental states. e mental state concepts, like belief, desire, intention,
seeing, being in pain, and others, are part of a theoretical framework. is framework incor-
porates the principles of how these mental states interact and relate to actions. Important
thereby is the necessary interrelation between the mental states, so that understanding one
of them seems to require understanding some or all of the others (Stone & Davies 1996).
In order to grasp the functional role of beliefs and thus grasping the concept of a belief, it
is necessary to understand how they relate to other mental states like seeing or desiring. For
example such a theory of mind would incorporate a principle like: ‘Persons who want that
P, and believe that Q would be suﬃcient to bring about P, and have no conìicting wants
or preferred strategies, will try to bring about that Q’ (Churchland 1988: 58-9).
However, it is highly questionable if animal mindreading capabilities fulëll this condi-
tion. While there is good evidence that suggests mastery of the concept of seeing and other
perceptual mental states (Cf. Call & Tomasello 2008), there is little evidence for other
states, like beliefs, which are commonly held to be vitally important to grasping the whole
mindreading theory. is has given various researchers reason to believe that mindreading
could have evolved in a series of individual steps and not as a all-or-nothing aﬀair (Povinelli
& Eddy 1996).
So if TT implies that mindreading is an all-or-nothing aﬀair, it seems to be an insuﬃcient
framework for understanding animal mindreading. However, there are two reasons why this
is not the case. First, TT need not imply that there is only one type of full-blown theory of
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mind. And secondly, failure to ënd empirical evidence for, say, the possession of a concept
of a belief in chimpanzees, does not imply that they do not in fact have such a concept. And
furthermore, the logical problem remains, which suggests an alternative explanation of pure
behaviour-reading, if no substantial evidence for a theory of mind in non-human animals
can be found.
Before discussing the ërst reason, let me elaborate on the last point. If we want to ënd
out how mindreading in animals work, TT oﬀers a solution that is very straightforward
and based on the similarities to human mindreading. Animals can predict behaviour of
others by using implicit principles that describe the interrelation between mental states and
their relation to actions and behaviour. Currently, this is still a viable option for explaining
mindreading in animals. ere are two possibilities at hand, either, it is possible to devise
a test that can overcome the logical problem, or this is not possible. If the latter is the case,
which is in doubt (Cf. Lurz 2011), TT cannot oﬀer an explanation of animal mindreading
since substantial parts of the picture lack empirical evidence⁹. However, if the logical prob-
lem can be overcome and it is possible to show that some animals understand others’ mental
states, then TT could be used to explain their mindreading abilities. If it is not possible
to show that chimpanzees understand beliefs, TT could still be used as a theory of animal
mindreading, since it need not imply that there is only one type of full-blown theory of
mind that is heavily dependent on the possession of a concept of belief.
e way TT has been described so far seems to imply that it can only give an explan-
ation of a theory of mind that is very like our own, depending crucially on some form of
belief-desire psychology and incorporating the principles that govern the interrelation of
⁹Of course, this is not a problem speciëcally for TT but applies equally to all sorts of theories which attempt
to explain animal mindreading.
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those important mental states. However, this need not be the case. In a very broad sense,
TT only says that there are some principles which govern the explanation and prediction
of others’ behaviour (Stone & Davies 1996)¹⁰. How exactly those principles are structured
and what content they require is an open question and may diﬀer between diﬀerent spe-
cies or developmental stages. One proposal is that there is a ‘body of knowledge’ (Stich &
Nichols 1995) which contains beliefs about the psychological facts that govern behaviour.
If this is true, there is no strong restriction to belief-desire psychology, but instead other,
maybe less concise, principles are capable of doing the job for mindreading. For example,
Tomasello and Call (2008: 191) suggest that the best way to explain the empirical evidence
for chimpanzee mindreading is in terms of a form of perception-goal theory of mind which
could easily be explained with a version of TT.
However, ST oﬀers a challenging alternative to TT in explaining animal mindreading
which in fact seems much more intuitive and less theoretical. emost important diﬀerence
between the two is that ST is process-driven whereas TT is theory-driven (Goldman 1989).
Mindreading as explained by ST is therefore essentially an ability which is enabled by a
speciëc process which is not in need of a special theoretical basis. However, this requires the
mindreader to embody the mental states of others in order to get the simulation-process to
run. e decision-making process is then simulated oﬀ-line with the mental inputs derived
from others. Essentially, this amounts to ënding out which available options are attractive
from the point of view of the other agent.
¹⁰Furthermore, TT seems to imply some heavy dependency on linguistic abilities, recognition of the prin-
ciples in question, and the conscious attempt to the theoretical framework underlying mindreading. However,
this is not necessarily implied at all.
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In this sense then, embodied oﬀ-line simulation is a more basic and lower-level seem-
ing cognitive ability. It does not rely on the mental representation of other’s mental states
in propositional format, as is often suggested by the TT approach (Gallese 2007). Even
though it is possible for us to form such sophisticated mental representation and formulate
a theory that accounts for their interrelation and connection to actions, it is neither our
only way of reading others’ minds, nor is it something we should be over-ready to attribute
to non-human animals. ST does not require us having an implicit theory because it relies
on the mindreader’s ability to act based on their own mental states. erefore, it does not
impose a new sophisticated ability, which seems very attractive if we are interested in animal
mindreading.
Because we have agreed that chimpanzees do have mental states that are responsible
for their actions and possess basic rationality, ST only has to explain how this ability can
be used to embody mental states of others and explain and predict behaviour by oﬀ-line
simulation. Gallese and Goldman (1998) further suggest a division between low-level and
high-level simulation. Whereas low-level simulation is based on strong internalized reactions
to speciëc behaviour (e.g. as seen within social monkey feeding behaviour (Addessi & Vis-
alberghi 2006)), high-level simulation is less internalized and not dependent on invariable,
possibly innate, mechanisms. e question remains whether low-level simulation can still
be considered genuine mindreading, and I will discuss this in the next section.
e empirical evidence that supports the ST approach to mindreading in animals mostly
focusses on the existence of mirror neurons in the premotor cortex of macaque monkeys and
in homologues brain areas of other species (Lurz 2011; Goldman 2006; Addessi & Visal-
berghi 2006; Pepperberg 2006; Gallese 2007). e feature that makes those neurons inter-
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esting for mindreading research is the fact that they show activity when the subject performs
a speciëc action and also when it observes the same type of action in others. is ‘direct
matching’ of the neural activity of observing and acting is believed to ‘underpin a direct
form of action understanding by exploiting embodied simulation, a speciëc mechanism by
means of which the brain/body system models its interaction with the world’ (Gallese 2007:
660). Diﬀerent experiments further support the hypothesis that the same mental action
representations are guiding both action production and action understanding.
is again would mean that the same inputs and mechanisms are at work when an an-
imal is producing goal-directed action as when it is predicting or understanding others’ goal-
directed actions by means of embodied oﬀ-line simulation. is supports the view that ST
can in fact explain action understanding and predicting in animals by pointing towards the
activity of mirror neurons. However, it is unclear if the application of such a mechanism
is rightly a case of ‘substantive mindreading ’, which is an activity that is systematically de-
pendent, but not strictly causal, on the creature’s representation of the mental states of others
(Bermúdez 2009: 148). For example, Addessi and Visalberghi (2006) describe the feeding
behaviour of macaque monkeys and the role mirror neurons play in the understanding of
others’ behaviour and guiding of the subject’s actions. However, the fact that macaques seem
to respond to the actions in a very systematic and causal way (i.e. the more conspeciëcs are
eating, the more they eat), suggests that the existence of mirror neurons may be supporting
low-level simulation but not necessarily the capability of high-level simulation. And thus,
even though ST can account for mindreading in animals, the existence of mirror neurons
alone does not account for the ability of substantive mindreading. ey do, looked at in
isolation, only show that the mirror neuron system is sophisticated enough to enable social
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interaction, but not necessarily mindreading abilities.
In this section, I have brieìy discussed the two main approaches to mindreading, Sim-
ulation eory and eory eory, and their relevance to mindreading in animals. Even
though a rudimentary form of TT seems implausible to explain animal mindreading, an
adapted and more liberal version of TT is capable of providing a reasonable explanation.
For example, Tomasello and Call (2008) suggest that chimpanzees are mindreaders with a
perception-goal theory of mind. On the other hand, ST oﬀers a more basic way of under-
standing the functioning of mindreading in animals. It relies on the fact that animals are
capable of producing goal-directed actions and are thus already equipped with the mental
modules that are needed for embodied simulation of others’ mental states and actions. is
is empirically supported by the existence of mirror neurons which seem to explain how oﬀ-
line embodied simulation is working on a neural level. However, there is doubt about the
relevance of such evidence for the claim that animals are substantive mindreaders and not
just good behaviour-readers with a good capability of understanding very speciëc actions
and behaviours of others (like feeding in groups of monkeys).
3.2 e mental content of animal mindreading
So far, themindreading abilities have been looked at only very broadly andmost importantly,
the question of the content of mindreading has been left in the shadows. However, it is
crucial to discuss the nature of the content of mindreading mechanisms in animals as this
will give rise to experimental paradigms which allow to test more exactly whether or not
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animals are capable of mindreading¹¹.
Generally, decision-making processes start of with speciëc desires and beliefs as inputs
which are fed in a decision-making mechanism and produce a decision as an output (Cf. Gold-
man 2006: 27). erefore, we can assume that animals, which have mental states and are
capable of decision-making have something like desires and beliefs as inputs of their decision-
making mechanism¹². In the case of simple decision-making, the contents are ërst-order
mental states which are fed into a decision-making mechanism of some sort.
However, the story is more complex if we look at the mindreading-mechanism. Accord-
ing to TT, the mindreader needs a representation of the other’s mental states (i.e. their beliefs
and desires), and a speciëc principle which explains how mental states relate to decisions,
as inputs. ese are then processed in a speciëc factual reasoning mechanism and generate a
belief about the predicted decision of the other (Goldman 2006: 28). e chimpanzee thus
reasons something like this:
pbelief1q : e dominant wants/has as a goal/desires/intends to gather as much food
as possible.
pbelief2q : e dominant beliefs/can see/knows that there are two items of food in the
room.
pbelief3q : Some principle or body of knowledge about how desires and beliefs relate
to actions (e.g. ‘agents who want that P, and believe that Q would be suﬃcient to
¹¹Furthermore, this is also important from the philosophical point of view. Mental state concepts are gen-
erally held to be intentional ; they have something as their content. However, it is debatable which contents are
accessible without language.
¹²I say ‘something like’ in order to account for the possibility that some animals have mental states which are
roughly like desires and beliefs but not exactly the same. For example, explaining an action in terms of what an
animal’s goals and perceptual states are would not be an explanation in terms of desires and beliefs. However, I
will speak of desires and beliefs in a broad sense to facilitate the discussion. Furthermore, Bermúdez (2003) has
given strong arguments for the view that we should think of animal mentality in terms of beliefs and desires.
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bring about P, and have no conìicting wants or preferred strategies, will try to bring
about that Q’ (Churchland 1988:58-9)).
ese beliefs are then fed into the factual reasoning mechanism and generate a belief
about a state of aﬀairs (i.e. the action the dominant will most likely perform). It is clear that
the inputs for mindreading of this type are of metarepresentational nature. ey are beliefs
about mental states, which themselves are representations of state of aﬀairs. e output
could be both a ërst-order belief (e.g. ‘I believe that he will do X’) or a second-order belief
(e.g. ‘I believe that she is feeling sad about X’), depending on the nature of the reasoning
process and the inputs.
If we contrast this with a chimpanzee who is only engaging in behaviour-reading activ-
ities, we can see that only ërst-order representational mental states are needed.
pbelief1q : e dominant shows behavioral cues and indicators X directed at food
gathering.
pbelief2q : e dominant had a clear line of sight to two items of food in the room.
pbelief3q : Whenever dominants show behavioral cues and indicators X and have clear
line of sight to two items of food, they will get both items.
When processing these three ërst-order beliefs about states of aﬀairs, the chimpanzee
arrives at the prediction that the dominant will get both items of food to which he had a
clear line of sight (Cf. Lurz 2011, Chapter 2). If we therefore want to explain mindreading
in animals with using some variety of TT, it will be necessary that the animal is capable
of forming higher-order metarepresentational beliefs about mental states of others and use
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those beliefs to understand and predict actions of others.
However, the picture is diﬀerent for ST. Because embodied simulation does not require
something like a factual reasoning mechanism, but instead depends only on the already
present decision-making mechanism, there are more possibilities for diﬀerent representa-
tional contents. When engaging in mindreading by means of embodied simulation, the
beliefs and desires of the other are used as pretend inputs in the personal decision-making
process. is then generates a pretend decision which will again be attributed to the other
(Goldman 2006: 30). erefore we get a process that looks something like this:
ppretend desire1q : I want g.
ppretend belief1q : If I do m, I can get g.
ese twomental states are then fed into the decision-makingmechanismwhich will give
us something like ‘I will do m’ as an output. However, in order to achieve oﬀ-line embodied
simulation, it is necessary to somehow attribute the pretend decision and pretend mental
states to others. One such way is by saying that eﬀectively the pretend mental states have
metarepresentational content, since they are diﬀerent from genuine írst-order mental states.
Although, while TT explains mindreading as an activity that uses metarepresentations, the
content of which (i.e. a ërst-order mental state) is ascribed to the target, ST seems to assume
that mindreading only needs to take ërst-order mental states and then project the output to
the target (Goldman 2006: 40).
is however presents a problem. e projection (‘T will do m’) is a genuine ërst-order
belief, derived, but diﬀerent, from a pretend decision (‘I will do m’) which is ascribed to the
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target T. However, this has to be some kind of belief if it should not be an actual decision.
But how can the decision-makingmechanism generate a belief about a decision by only using
pretend desires and beliefs as inputs, when they are not in fact also higher-order beliefs with
those pretend desires and beliefs as their content. is again would mean that ST has to
assume that the mindreading subject is capable of having higher-order mental states with
metarepresentational content¹³.
erefore it seems that mindreading, whether explained by TT or ST, always has to
include some form of metarepresentational content. is in eﬀect means that mindreading
is a metacognitive activity as it necessarily requires having mental states with other mental
states as their content. In the case of TT, this was pretty clear from the start, because TT
relies on beliefs about mental states whenever we are dealing with genuine mindreading, and
not mere behaviour-reading. But in the case of ST the above argument shows that having
pretend desires and beliefs eﬀectively implies having further beliefs about those mental states
(i.e. that they are in fact not my desires but those of T). I will now explore a possibility
that tries to explain genuine mindreading by means of simulation, but without need of
metarepresentations to do the job of distinguishing between genuine mental states and pretend
mental states.
3.3 Simulation without metarepresentation
If we want to explain the possibility of simulation which does not rely on metarepresenta-
tional content, we need to ënd a way of explaining the mindreading in question that satisëes
the following three conditions:
¹³is is not an argument against ST, but an argument against the claim that mindreading, as explained by
standard ST, does not require metarepresentational content by the mindreading subject.
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(1) e process or mechanism uses only ërst-order representations of states of aﬀairs as
inputs and outputs.
(2) e process or mechanism does not rely on other metarepresentational capacities dur-
ing the decision-making or projection process.
(3) e whole activity is still genuinely mindreading.
I will argue that there is no possibility to satisfy all the three conditions at once. Addi-
tionally, it seems to be obvious that these three conditions are jointly necessary in order to
speak of mindreading without metarepresentation. Let me brieìy explain why. (1) seems to
be pretty straight-forward; if we want to explain mindreading without the need for higher-
order representations, the inputs and outputs should clearly be ërst-order mental states.
Additionally, we also want to exclude any other necessary higher-order mental states which
would be needed to get to the mindreading stage at all. is is what is meant by (2). Fur-
thermore, we are interested in the ability to think about mental states of others and not just
their behaviour. is is why (3) needs to be satisëed in order to make a strong case for the
possibility of mindreading without metarepresentation.
How could simulation work without need of higher-order mental states like beliefs about
beliefs or desires? First oﬀ, it requires that the subject does have beliefs about the behaviour
of others. is is straight-forward, as I have already indicated how this might look. A
chimpanzee is able to form a belief about the line of gaze of another chimpanzee and could
use this belief to predict and explain behaviour (Lurz 2011: Chapter 3). Furthermore,
there are proponents of the view that thinking about one’s own mental state does not need
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metarepresentational content but can be achieved by employing only ërst-ordermental states
(Proust 2007, 2010; Hieronymi 2009; Peacocke 2008, 2009). So, by evaluating one’s own
thoughts by means of mental simulation and unconscious control, it is possible to think
about thoughts without the need for higher-order mental representation.
e question remains though, howwe can ët these diﬀerent facts into one theory that can
explain mindreading, i.e. a capacity that not only involves having thoughts about thoughts,
but projecting those mental states on to others, which involves having some concept of the
mental state in question. Reìecting upon one’s own beliefs might not involve metarepres-
entational content (Cf. Arango-Muñoz 2010), but projecting a belief onto somebody else
necessarily involves having some concept or other of the state in question and this implies
the capability of having mental states with metarepresentational content.
If we want to achieve genuine mindreading, there needs to be a point where the subject
has a belief-like state about a mental state of someone else. e chimpanzee utilizing the
concept of seeing to understand a dominant’s behaviour, needs to have some belief of the
form
 [dominant  X] .
And this is clearly a belief with metarepresentational content. Even if we use ST and are
sympathetic to the view that only pretend beliefs and desires are required, there is still the
need to ascribe to the mindreading subject some beliefs about the mental states of the other
at one point or the other. If we think that this is not necessary, we would be in serious need
of a clear explanation on why this is genuine mindreading and not just behaviour-reading.
If the subject only utilizes ërst-order representations of state of aﬀairs, and never actually
ascribes a mental state to another being, it is hard to accept that we are in fact talking about
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mindreading at all.
I believe that these reasons are suﬃcient to undermine the possibility of mindreading
without metarepresentations. On the TT-view we are clearly in need of beliefs about mental
states of others, and the same applies, upon closer reìection for ST. However, this does
not imply that mindreading cannot be achieved by nonverbal animals like chimpanzees.
It would require further arguments to support the view that metarepresentational content
can only be possible in the presence of language (e.g. Bermúdez 2003). While I am very
suspicious about the success of any such arguments, I cannot discuss them at this point
and will instead grant that some form of (metarepresentational) mindreading is in principle
accessible to nonverbal, non-human animals. erefore, I will now discuss the empirical
evidence that suggests the ability of chimpanzees to understand and use diﬀerent mental
state concepts.
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4 Are chimpanzees mindreaders?
ere is a substantive amount of empirical data that is discussed on the subject of chimpan-
zees’ ability to attribute mental states to others. is of course means that there is simply
not enough space here to discuss all the diﬀerent experimental protocols and ëndings which
are related to the diﬀerent mental states in question. erefore, I will only discuss some
of the more striking and well-discussed empirical data which has been gathered to give an
overview over the diﬀerent experiments which are used to support the mindreading hypo-
thesis for chimpanzees. Furthermore, I will point out the problems which are faced by those
experiments and judge whether or not it is possible to say that the experiments do in fact
show a capacity to understand others’ mental states.
For reasons I have stated earlier, it makes sense to look at the diﬀerent mental states
individually, since it is very doubtful if mindreading is an all-or-nothing aﬀair (Povinelli &
Eddy 1996). erefore, I will ërst discuss the mental states of seeing and knowing, for they
are very directly connected to behavioral indicators. After that the understanding of beliefs
is discussed, which will bear much weight for it is considered a very important mental state,
necessary to fully grasp other mental state concepts. Finally, it would also be interesting
to discuss chimpanzees’ understanding of intentions and goals. However, the empirical data
in this respect is unfortunately very sparse, which makes a discussion unproductive (Cf.
Tomasello et al. 2003, Call & Tomasello 2008).
4.1 Seeing and knowing
Seeing and knowing are two mental states which are closely related. However, understand-
ing of the two has to be tested in quite diﬀerent ways. I will discuss the Competitive Paradigm
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Experiments by Hare et al. (2000, 2001) which deal with chimpanzees’ understanding of see-
ing. As well, I will look at ëndings from various experiments which use the knower-guesser
protocol (Premack 1988; Gómez & Teixidor 1992; Hare et al. 2001; Kuroshima et al. 2002,
2003) in order to examine the chimpanzee’s understanding of the concept of knowing.
4.1.1 Seeing
When testing for chimpanzees’ understanding the concept of seeing, Hare and colleagues
(2000) have designed an experiment which involves two chimpanzees, a subordinate subject
and a dominant, both competing for food items located in a room between them¹⁴. e
subject learned that the dominant would get all the food items which are out in the open and
visible to him. ere were then three diﬀerent test-scenarios. In the ërst, both food items
were visible to both chimpanzees. In such cases, the subject would not engage and refrain
from taking either piece, since it was aware of the dominant seeing both food items. In the
second scenario, one item was placed visible for both chimpanzees, but another item was
placed behind an opaque barrier, only visible to the subject. It was reasoned that the subject
would realize that the dominant could not see the second food item, and thus retrieve it
when released from it’s room. In order to rule out the possibility of the subject waiting for
the dominant to make the ërst move and then react on it’s behaviour, it was released slightly
earlier so that it had to make a decision ërst. Finally, they conducted a further test where
¹⁴Hare (2001) argues that due the competitiveness of primate social lives, experiments based on cooperation,
like the one conducted by Premack andWoodruﬀ in 1978, are not the best way to explore their cognitive abilities.
Instead, since their social lives are shaped by competition and not cooperation, their cognitive abilities are very
likely to be adapted to situations which involve competition, but not cooperation. In order therefore to further
validate the signiëcance of research on primate social cognition, experiments should involve the competitive
aspect of social cognition.
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one of the food items was behind a transparent barrier, so that the dominant could see both.
It was suggested that the subject would then realize that the dominant could see through the
barrier and thus see both food items, and therefore the subject would not engage.
e tested chimpanzees in fact behaved as predicted and usually tried to retrieve only
food that was not seen by the dominant, i.e. food behind an opaque barrier or inside of
the subjects own room, but not food that was out in the open or behind a transparent bar-
rier. is lead to the conclusion that chimpanzees can understand and attribute the mental
concept of seeing to conspeciëcs. Because the subject could not see through the opaque
barrier, it reasoned that the dominant could also not see through. On the same reasoning it
attributed to the dominant the state of seeing the food when it was placed behind transpar-
ent barriers and out in the open.
However, this mentalistic interpretation was challenged on the basis that in these exper-
iments attributing of seeing to chimpanzee rests solely upon certain behavioral indicators
(Penn & Povinelli 2007). ‘Although one can see another subject looking at an object, one
cannot see his or her seeing the object’ (Lurz 2011: 34, emphasis mine). Mental state attribu-
tions cannot be observed directly and the experimental protocol used by Hare and colleagues
cannot circumvent this problem. e complementary behaviour-reading hypothesis sug-
gests that the subject chimpanzee knew only which items the dominant was looking at and
believed that those were oﬀ limits. One such hypothesis which does not rely on mindread-
ing simply states that the dominant has put his ‘evil eye’ on the items it was looking at, thus
making them oﬀ limits for the subject (Povinelli & Vonk 2006).
Even though Tomasello and Call (2006) rightly point out that the mindreading hypo-
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thesis is a more economical theory that explains how chimpanzees master so many diﬀerent
tasks which supposedly involve attribution of seeing to others, they fail to propose a test that
can decide directly between the mindreading hypothesis and the complementary behaviour-
reading hypothesis for the concept of seeing.
Recently, Robert Lurz (2011) has suggested a theory that could theoretically and practic-
ally decide between those two hypotheses and answer the question of whether or not animals
are capable of attributing states of seeing to others and thus possessing that mental concept.
e general idea behind this suggestion is that possess the concept seeing has a speciëc pur-
pose (i.e. understanding the diﬀerence between appearance and reality). Lurz writes (p. 84)
that
[u]nderstanding that a dominant conspeciëc, for example, does not see the cam-
ouìaged insect before it as an edible insect but as a leaf would enable a sub-
ordinate mindreading conspeciëc to predict that the dominant conspeciëc in
this setting will not try to eat the insect [...]. Were a complementary behavior-
reading subordinate [i.e. one that is not able to attribute mental states] placed
in the very same situation as this mindreading one, it would be capable of un-
derstanding only that the dominant conspeciëc is looking directly at an edible
insect.
us, this theory is called the appearance-reality mindreading (ARM) theory of mindread-
ing. He then suggests diﬀerent experimental setups which could test for understanding the
diﬀerence between appearance and reality and are related to the setup byHare and colleagues
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(2000). ey all involve diﬀerent kinds of visual barriers which change the appearance of
the item behind it, thus allowing the subject to diﬀerentiate between what the dominant
is merely looking at and what he is seeing. ese experimental protocols are able to rule
out any complementary behaviour-reading hypothesis because of the fact that the subject
has to attribute the mental state of seeing-as to the dominant in order to successfully master
the task. If for example a barrier changes the color of a food item to something undesir-
able for the dominant, the subject could see that (a) the dominant is looking at the food
item which is behind a colored barrier, (b) the barrier makes everything behind it look, for
example, red and thus undesirable in this case, (c) the dominant sees the food item behind
the barrier in undesirable colors, and thus will not get it. It seems to be clear that (c) can
not be achieved through a behaviour-reading hypothesis that involves line of gaze, since it
essentially contains a manipulating factor which inserts a diﬀerence between appearance and
reality.
us, while current protocols have failed to show that chimpanzees understand seeing,
ARM proposes a way of distinguishing the mindreading aspect of social cognition by im-
plementing the importance of the appearance-reality distinction for the mental concept of
seeing.
4.1.2 Knowing
In order to ënd out if chimpanzees have a concept of knowing, experiments often make use
of the knower-guesser protocol. is setup relies on the distinction between a knowing agent
and a guessing agent, and the subject’s supposed understanding of this diﬀerence. ey
are however, normally conducted in a way that tests for recognition of past states of seeing.
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erefore, the same general problems which apply to the mindreading hypothesis of seeing
apply to the attribution of the concept of knowing. According to the protocol, chimpanzees
attribute to another agent a state of knowing the location of an object, if they also attribute a
state of having seen the location of the object in the past. Similarly, the chimpanzee attributes
the state of ignorance to another agent, if there is an absence of past states of seeing in the
other agent (Cf. Lurz 2011).
In this spirit Hare and colleagues (2001) conducted an experiment very similar to their
2000 study, again using the Competitive Paradigm with a subordinate subject and a domin-
ant chimpanzee. However, in this experiment the dominant either witnessed the hiding of
food in one of two opaque containers or he did not see the hiding. e subordinate subject
was able to observe the hiding and thus see whether the dominant could witness the hiding
process. e upshot of the experiment was that the subject went for the food items more
often when it had observed the dominant not having seen the hiding and thus not knowing
where the food was.
Similarly, Kuroshima and colleagues (2002, 2003) conducted experiments with capuchin
monkeys where the animals were confronted with a knowing experimenter (i.e. an agent
which the monkeys had witnessed seeing the baiting process) and a guessing experimenter
(i.e. an agent which the monkeys had witnessed not seeing the baiting process). Appar-
ently, the monkeys learned to prefer the containers which were indicated by the knower
over those touched by the guesser. is lead Kuroshima and colleagues to conclude that the
monkeys understood the relationship between seeing and knowing. However, the logical
problem applies to this study as well. e design is not able to eliminate a complementary
behaviour-reading hypothesis according to which the attribution of knowledge is merely an
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attribution of having had a direct line of gaze in the past, which is a non-mentalistic relation
between an observer and an object.
In order to exclude such complementary behaviour-reading explanations for the concept
of knowing, a test would be needed which works similarly as the one proposed by ARM.e
relation between knowing and having seen in the past should allow a design that uses the
protocol which tests for the ability to attribute states of seeing and adapt it to test for the
attribution of states of knowing. A proposal might be to use the setup of Hare and colleagues
(2000, 2001) but use a transparent, but appearance-changing, barrier, as suggested by Lurz
(2011). In one case the subordinate subject observes that the dominant sees the original
attractive item being place behind the appearance-changing barrier, thus knowing that the
dominant knows that there is an attractive item behind the barrier, even though it appears
to be unattractive. In the other case the subordinate witnesses that the dominant does not
see the baiting process. If the chimpanzee understands the state of knowing, it should not
go for the item when it had observed the dominant seeing the baiting process. However, it
is unclear, whether such a complex experimental setup is possible to conduct without thus
inducing other problems¹⁵.
4.2 Beliefs
Following the same logic as in the last section, we now come to the discussion of chim-
panzee’s understanding of the concept of belief. ere are very inìuential philosophical
¹⁵Among these other problems are issues concerningmemory capabilities of chimpanzees and questions about
how much mental processing power we can assume that chimpanzees possess. Furthermore, it has to be possible
for the subject to learn the routines of the experiment without loss of concentration of attentiveness, etc.
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arguments that deny the possibility of having beliefs without language (Cf. Davidson 1975,
1982) which unfortunately cannot be discussed here. Nowadays, it is a widespread view that
the theoretical arguments brought forward in this respect fail to do justice to the empirical
facts, which strongly support the view that at least some animals are capable of having genu-
ine beliefs of the form ‘S beliefs that p’, where p stands for a speciëc state of aﬀairs¹⁶. ey
are thus capable of representing others as being in a relation to actual state of aﬀairs (e.g.
having a direct line of gaze) and they can themselves represent nonactual state of aﬀairs (e.g.
trying out solutions of a problem in their head, as seen in ravens (Heinrich 1995; Heinrich
& Bugnyar 2005)). However, there is a lack of evidence that supports the claim that chim-
panzees and other animals are capable of representing others as having a relation to nonactual
states of aﬀairs. For this would be necessary if they were able to attribute belief-states to others
(Lurz 2011: 138).
e test for possession of the concept of belief is usually conducted by testing the un-
derstanding of false belief (Cf. Harman 1978). In these tests, subjects witness how an agent
is induced a false belief about the location of an object. If the subject has the concept of a
belief it should understand that reality and the other agent’s representation of reality are not
matching, thus attributing to the agent a false belief. When testing chimpanzees, Call and
Tomasello (1999) ran a cooperative ‘bait-and-switch’ test. In this test chimpanzees observed
how an experimenter baited one of several containers while a communicator watched the
¹⁶Among the evidence that language is not necessary for belief-attribution to others is the study by Onishi
and Baillargeon (2005), which shows that even 15-months old human infants seem to have a concept of belief
and are able to attribute beliefs to others. However, it is unclear how this empirical evidence relates to the
animal issue. While humans are in principle capable of language and thus have the cognitive setup to achieve
this task, the same is not true for chimpanzees and others. So it is an open possibility that nonverbal humans
do understand beliefs of others but nonverbal, nonhuman animals do not.
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baiting. e chimpanzees were not able to see which container was baited but they could
see that the communicator was facing the scene. After that the communicator marked the
baited containers and the chimpanzees learned to associate the mark with the reward that
was given to them when they chose the correct container.
In the test trial, the communicator turned around, while the experimenter switched
the location of the food. us, the communicator’s belief about the location of the food
no longer matched reality. If chimpanzees understood the concept of belief, they should
understand that the communicator no longer had a correct belief and therefore ignore the
communicator’s mark. However, this did not happen, suggesting that chimpanzees were
incapable of attributing genuine beliefs to others.
As a result of the failure of this experiment, Kaminski et al. (2008) conducted a similar
experiment with the diﬀerence that two chimpanzees were competing for food items (hence
calling it the competitive ‘bait-and-switch’ test). ey reasoned that the chimpanzees failed in
the original test because they had to engage in cooperative action which is not in the natural
repertoire of chimpanzees. eir own test uses a rather complex setup of two chimpanzees
(one of which was the subject subordinate and the other the dominant) and a sliding table
with three containers. While both chimpanzees were watching, one of the containers was
baited with a highly desirable reward. After that, only the subject chimpanzee witnessed one
of the following two actions. Either an unknown-lift, where the baited container was lifted
and put back, but the location of the food was not changed. Or an unknown-shift, where
the baited container was lifted and the location of the reward was changed. In the next
step, the dominant was allowed to choose one container, while the subject was unable to see
anything. If the chosen container was baited, the competitor received the reward and the
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container was put back into place, in order to not indicate to the subject which container
was chosen by the dominant. As soon as this happened, the subject was allowed to either
choose one of the containers or go for a less desirable item which was not on the table.
Kaminsky et al. suggested that the subject should show a preference for the more desir-
able reward in the unknown-shift case, but not in the unknown-lift case. If it understands
the concept of belief, it should also understand that the competitor’s belief about the loc-
ation is correct in the unknown-lift case, but false in the unknown-shift case. erefore
it should have reason to believe that the competitor would choose correctly in the former,
but incorrectly in the latter. However, the chimpanzees did not show this preference, but
instead the subject chimpanzees were just as likely to choose the less desirable reward in the
unknown-lift case as in the unknown-shift case.
is then is further evidence that chimpanzees might not have a concept of belief and
are incapable of attributing this mental state to others. However, we cannot conclude from
these experimental ëndings that chimpanzees do not have the concept of a belief. In fact, this
is an open empirical and theoretical question which requires further, well designed exper-
iments which are able to support the mindreading hypothesis for belief-attribution. ree
possible designs are suggested by Robert Lurz (2011: Chapter 4), which are very complex
and test for the animal’s ability to distinguish appearance from reality by testing their suc-
cess in deceptive amodal completion tasks. In these tasks, chimpanzees would be required to
distinguish between the appearance of partly occluded objects and their real look. However,
there is not enough space to discuss these very complex tasks in more detail, in part because
of the fact that they only constitute a theoretical possibility and have not been conducted
on chimpanzees.
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It has been shown in this section that experiments testing the possession of the concept
of belief in chimpanzees have almost always returned negative results. However, this does
not mean that they in fact are incapable of attributing beliefs to others. In fact, there are a
number of experimental designs to test for this mindreading ability, which however have not
been conducted yet. Additionally, it has become evident that testing for belief-attribution in
nonverbal animals requires very complex setups. Because the concept of belief comes with
speciëc conditions of understanding, these have to be tested for in the experiments without
thus inducing the logical problem or other issues.
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5 Conclusion
It has become obvious that ënding out if chimpanzees are mindreaders is an intricate quest.
ere are not only practical issues about how best to design experiments that help discover
the cognitive abilities of nonverbal animals. Also, there are theoretical questions of how
to decide between diﬀerent theories of mindreading, how the diﬀerent mental states are
interrelated and bear on the chimpanzee’s understanding of individual ones.
I started oﬀ with introducing the diﬀerent terms of mindreading and behaviour-reading
and the logical problem which describes the experimental diﬃculty of distinguishing the
two activities in nonverbal animals. While mindreading involves the ascription of mental
states to others, behaviour-reading only relies on recognizing others’ behaviour and anticip-
ating their next moves. e logical problem revealed that by conducting experiments which
can only rely on observing the behaviour of nonverbal animals, it is diﬃcult to support
the mindreading hypothesis, which states that some nonverbal animals sometimes attribute
mental states to others. is again cannot be observed directly, and only with cleverly set
up experiments could it be possible to indirectly observe the mental attributions.
After that, diﬀerent theories explaining mindreading have been examined and put into
relation with animal mindreading. eory eory proposes that mindreading is a theory-
driven activity based on possessing implicit principles which state the interrelation of diﬀerent
mental states and their conjunction to actions and decision. Simulationeory on the other
hand states that mindreading is a process-driven activity which relies on the agent’s intrinsic
capability to make rational decisions. By using the mental states of others as pretend inputs
to the own decision-making mechanism, they are simulated and generate a pretend output
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which then again is projected onto the other agent.
I have then argued that whatever theoretical framework we use to explain mindreading
in chimpanzees and other animals, the mindreading subject has to be able to generate mental
states with metarepresentational content. Only if this is achieved can we attribute mindread-
ing abilities and understanding of mental state concepts. However, I have also stated that
further arguments are needed to support the view that having mental states with metarep-
resentational content is only possible with language, and expressed my doubt based on the
experimental evidence that suggests some mindreading capability in nonverbal animals and
humans.
Finally, I have discussed some of the many experimental protocols that discuss chim-
panzees’ understanding of seeing, knowing and believing. Even though the experiments show
that chimpanzees are extremely skilled in solving the diﬀerent problems they were facing
in the tasks, the experiments mostly fail to show that mindreading the best explanation of
their success. e logical problem strikes again and shows us that there is an urgent need
to design experimental protocols which can indirectly observe the mindreading activity by
imposing tasks which can only be solved by imputing mental states to others. However, a
lot of experiments which involve tasks of that type have returned negative results.
is also indicates the further direction in which research in animal mindreading should
go. First, there is a need to solve the logical problem for diﬀerent mental states and distin-
guish mindreading-abilities from behaviour reading-abilities. Secondly, it would be interest-
ing to get further empirical evidence that can decide if eoryeory or Simulationeory
is the best way to explain animal mindreading. My suggestion is that we need a mixture of
both in order to explain all diﬀerent domains of mindreading, for the diverse tasks involve
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distinct mental capacities. And this again suggests that diﬀerent mental processes are needed
to successfully master all these tasks. And last but not least, there is a need to investigate
further into the animals’ abilities of understanding diﬀerent mental states and how those are
interrelated.
F L W
University of Sheﬃeld, August 2011
W : ǫǭ’ǰǫǭ
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